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Corruption’s Effect on Growth and 
its Transmission Channels 
Lorenzo Pellegrini and Reyer Gerlagh*
I. INTRODUCTION
It is a common finding in the literature that corruption hinders economic
growth (Jain 2001, Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny 1995, 1996, Gupta, de Mello
and Sharan 2001, Kaufmann 1997, Mauro 1995, 1997, 1998, Murphy, Shleifer
and Vishny 1991, Porta and Vannucci 1997, Tanzi and Davoodi 1997). In this
paper, we study empirically the direct and indirect transmission channels
through which corruption affects growth levels. Specifically, we focus on the
effect of corruption on investment, schooling, trade policy, and political stabil-
ity, and estimate the contribution of the various channels to the overall negative
effect of corruption on growth.
There is a growing interest in the relation between economic growth and the
institutional environment. The new interest is partly driven by new data that
have become available over the past decades. The Freedom House Indexes of
Political Freedoms and Civil Liberties, sometimes referred to by the name of
their creator Raymond Gastil, and the indicators from Business Environment
Risk Intelligence are among the indexes that appeared in the early 70s. Nowa-
days, we have a rich data set from sources that are also used by companies to
evaluate investment opportunities in foreign countries. These data cover many
aspects of the economic environment that are considered important by eco-
nomic agents: risk of expropriation, definition of property rights, contract en-
forceability, infrastructure quality, working of markets, bureaucratic efficiency,
political and institutional stability, repudiation of contracts by government, and
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so forth. Also, data on institutional features have become available for statisti-
cal use by international institutions and by policy advisors. The data employed
in this paper fall in the latter category. We use data on corruption, available
since 1995, gathered by Transparency International, a non-governmental or-
ganisation providing free access to its information.
Though, nowadays, it is common to assume that corruption negatively af-
fects growth, the conclusion is not trivial. According to some earlier authors,
corruption is like grease for the economy. Leff (1964) and Huntington (1968)
underline two mechanisms through which corruption can foster economic
growth. Bribes can help firms to avoid burdensome bureaucratic regulations
and they can serve as an incentive to civil servants to accomplish their duties.
Lui (1985) argues that agenda-setting and labour efforts of government offi-
cials can be made more efficient through bribes.
These arguments, in support for the hypothesis that corruption is beneficial
for economic output, rely however on static efficiency arguments, and
Kaufmann (1997) offers a comprehensive list of practical and theoretical short-
comings. Also, the recent empirical literature based on time series suggests less
optimistic growth scenarios are plausible for countries affected by pervasive
corruption. North (1990) emphasises the need of reliable institutions (incom-
patible with corruption) to defend property rights and reduce transaction costs;
institutions are identified as ‘the underlying determinant of the long-run per-
formance of economies’ (p. 107). Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1991) assert
that corrupted societies create incentives that stimulate the most talented peo-
ple to earn their income through bribing rather than in more productive activi-
ties. Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1995, 1996) argue that agreements pro-
duced by corrupted practices are inherently unenforceable and this produces an
uncertainty that is disadvantageous to the economic process. Mauro (1995)
finds, through empirical research, evidence of a negative relationship between
corruption and investment, and through this channel, eventually, corruption
lowers economic growth. As the basic mechanism behind this finding, Mauro
(1998) claims that corruption, when understood as an institution that raises rev-
enues for the administration, has more distortionary effects than taxation be-
cause of its illegal character. Economic agents spent substantial efforts to avoid
detection and punishment.
In addition to the distortionary effect of corruption on the private sector, dif-
ferent authors have argued that corruption also affects the ways policy makers
take decisions. Krueger (1993a, 1993b) argues that incompetent policies are
not always the result of lack of knowledge, but rather the outcome of decision-
makers’ efforts to capture personal rents. With high level of corruption, the al-
location of government resources is influenced by bribe opportunities, and re-
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sources are located to activities with a high potential for bribes to be collected,
as opposed to welfare enhancing activities (Porta and Vannucci 1997). Bardhan
(1997), along the same lines, argues that ‘because different activities have dif-
ferent chances of detection for bribes, there will be some substitution effect fol-
lowing from corruption by which corrupt officials will try to induce investment
and transactions in the direction of lower-detection activities’ (p. 1326)1. Tanzi
and Davoodi (1997) provide evidence that corrupted government officials di-
rect public investment towards large projects, possibly at the expense of basis
expenditures such as for education and health. They put forward both theoreti-
cal arguments and empirical evidence supporting the idea that corruption neg-
atively affects the quality of infrastructures. Gupta, de Mello and Sharan (2001)
claim that the defence sector is very sensitive to bribes, while it does not con-
tribute much to economic growth, and indeed, in their empirical analysis they
find a positive correlation between the level of corruption and defence ex-
penses.
In sum, recent studies on the impact of corruption on the economy indicate
that the effects of corruption are negative and pervasive throughout the econ-
omy (Jain 2001, p. 72). Yet, we can only estimate empirically the effect of cor-
ruption on economic growth when corruption is not endogenous to the growth
process, that is, we need to make sure that the causality does not run the other
way around, from low income levels to corruption. It could be that low income
would result in poor institutional settings which, in turn, create incentives for
civil servants to collect bribes. But empirical work suggests that the level of
corruption is better explained by the quality of economic institutions, rather
than by income. Corruption practices among civil servants often reflect cum-
bersome bureaucratic procedures for which the help of state employees is nec-
essary, and these state employees are in a position to expect payments for ful-
filling their duties. Indeed, Mauro (1995) finds high correlation levels between
corruption and other institutional quality indexes. Furthermore, Acemoglu,
Johnson and Robinson (2001) and Easterly and Levine (2002) have shown that
institutions are very persistent over time and are fundamental determinants of
economic growth. This, in turn, implies a high degree of persistence over time
of corruption levels, so that we can consider corruption as an exogenous vari-
able when used in regressions explaining recent growth rates. Still, to be sure,
when carrying out regression analysis, we will explicitly check for the causality
1. In Italy, court cases (in the ‘clean hands’ trials) have shown that governments were devoting an
unusual amount of resources to assist developing countries because of favourable bribe collec-
tion opportunities. Bribe collection was easier in this part of public expenditures because of the
difficulties of Italian judges to undertake enquiries abroad, especially in developing countries
(Bollini and Reich 1994).
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among corruption, investments, schooling, openness, political instability, and
economic growth, using legal origins as an instrumental variable for corrup-
tion.
In the present paper, we use a method similar to one developed by Mo (2000,
2001) and elaborated on in Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004), to analyse empiri-
cally the contribution of various direct and indirect channels through which
corruption affects economic growth. Our findings suggest that corruption
slows down economic growth, mainly through its effect on investments and
trade policies. The latter transmission channel has not been taken into account
in previous empirical work, while trade openness has been shown to be of ma-
jor importance for economic growth. Sachs and Warner (1995), in their exten-
sive analysis, find strong evidence of convergence among open economies and
higher growth rates in economies after trade liberalisation programmes.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, basis cross-country re-
gressions are presented with estimates of the direct effect of investments,
schooling, trade openness, political instability, and corruption, on growth. In
Section III, the transmission channels through which corruption affects growth
are studied and their relative importance and long-term effect on growth are
calculated. The last section concludes. Furthermore, Appendix 1 provides the
derivation of long-term income effect, Appendix 2 provides estimates with in-
strumental variables for corruption and robustness checks of our main results
and Appendix 3 provides a description of the variables and of the sources.
II. CROSS COUNTRY GROWTH REGRESSIONS
In this Section, we estimate basic growth regressions to quantify the effect of
corruption on economic growth, both in a context with and without other inde-
pendent variables. At this stage we will not produce an explicit estimate of the
transmission channels. We start with the common regression equation in which
the dependent variable G denotes the GDP growth rate per year in the period
from t0 = 1975 to tT = 1996: Gi = (1/T)ln(YT
i /Y0
i). We include (the natural loga-
rithm of ) the level of initial income, ln(Y0
i), as independent variable and ex-
pect, according to the conditional convergence hypothesis, that this variable
will have a negative coefficient, α1 < 0. That is, we expect the growth rate of
income to be negatively associated with the level of income at the beginning of
the period. As second independent variable, we take corruption, Ci, the coeffi-
cient of which, α2, is subject of the analysis, and as the other independent var-
iables, denoted by the vector Zi, we take the common regression variables in the
growth literature (e.g. Levine and Renelt 1992, Sachs and Warner 1995) that
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are possibly linked with corruption as discussed in the next section: invest-
ments, schooling, trade openness, and political instability.
Gi = α0 + α1 ln(Y0
i) + α2Ci + α3Zi + εi (1)
where the superscript i denotes each country in the sample. The corruption
variable measures the extent to which bribes and bribe asking were common in a
country, over the period 1980–1985. It covers 48 countries in our sample. More
recent indexes cover a larger sample of countries and are highly correlated with
the old data, but to make sure that the corruption variable is not endogenous, we
preferred to use the earliest data on corruption levels. We checked the robustness
of our analysis to this decision and found that the use of data on corruption for the
period 1988–1992 does not change substantially the results of our analysis2. We
consider the corruption data for the period 1980–1985 exogenously, on the basis
of the inertia in formal and informal institutions (North 1990), and indeed, the
corruption perception indexes are highly correlated over time3. Data are from the
Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International.
The investment variable presents the percentage of gross investment (public
and private) on GDP in the period 1975–1996. The proper time frame for the
investment variable is subject to discussion. We preferred to have an average
for the whole period as the most reliable measure of the size of investment in
the economy, keeping in mind that there could be an endogeneity problem be-
tween the growth rate and investment. For a comprehensive treatment thereof,
we refer to Temple (1999). Data on income, investments, and growth levels
come from the Penn World table 6.0. The schooling variable measures the av-
erage years of schooling in the population over 25 in the year 1975; this varia-
ble is considered an approximation for the investments in human capital. Data
are from the International Data on Educational Attainment by Barro and Lee.
The variable trade openness measures the number of years in which the coun-
try has been open for trade according to Sachs and Warner (1995) criteria over
the period 1965–1990. The variable political instability measures the averaged
sum of revolutions and the number of assassinations per million people per year
in the period 1970–1985. Data on trade openness are taken from the Natural Re-
source Abundance and Economic Growth data set (Sachs and Warner) and the
ones on political instability are from the Barro and Lee dataset. A comprehensive
description of sources and variables is presented in the appendix.
2. The overall effect of corruption on growth is similar (the new coefficient in equation (3) is –0.39
versus –0.38) and investment and openness remain the most important transmission channels.
3. The Corruption Perception Index for 1980–1985 and for 2001 have a correlation of 89%.
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Table 1
Growth regressions as in equation (1)
Regression (1) in Table 1 presents the results of estimating equation (1) includ-
ing only the initial income level and corruption as independent variables. The
coefficients have the predicted signs and are statistically significant at 1%: the
coefficient on initial income is negative and equal to 1.19 and the one on cor-
ruption is negative and equal to 0.38. Corruption has substantial impact on eco-
nomic growth and income. A decrease in the corruption level of one standard
deviation – e.g., from the position of the Philippines to the one of India, or from
the position of Turkey to the one of Spain – increases economic growth by ap-
proximately 1 per cent per year4, and increases the long-term income level by
about 140 per cent5. However, the R2 of the first regression is only 0.17. The
relation between corruption and the growth rate can be seen in Figure 1.
Independent variable: G75–96 (1) (2) (3)
Constant 14.22 14.48 15.54
lnY1975
(0.96)
–1.19***
(0.36)
–1.89***
(0.32)
–1.96***
(0.33)
Investment
(7.51)
0.14***
(0.03)
0.14***
(0.03)
Schooling
(2.72)
0.13
(0.10)
0.11
(0.10)
Openness
(0.46)
1.65***
(0.43)
1.54***
(0.46)
Political instability
(0.12)
–3.00**
(1.39)
–2.58*
(1.51)
Corruption
(2.76)
–0.38***
(0.13)
–0.07
(0.10)
N 48 48 48
Adjusted R2 0.17 0.62 0.62
Notes: OLS estimation with average annual GDP per capita growth rate as dependent variable. Su-
perscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5, 1% of significance, respectively. Standard deviations are 
in parenthesis under the independent variables, standard errors are in parenthesis under the coeffi-
cients.
4. From Table 1, we multiply the standard deviation for corruption (2.76) with its coefficient (0.38),
and find 2.76 × 0.38 = 1.05.
5. From Table 1, we multiply the standard deviation for corruption (2.76) with its coefficient (0.38),
and divide this by the coefficient for initial income (1.19) to calculate the effect on the log of
long-term income. The change in income is now calculated as exp(2.76 × 0.38 / 1.19) – 1 = 1.41.
See Appendix 1 for a derivation and justification of this procedure.
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Figure 1
Growth rate of per capita income, in the period 1975–96, versus corruption, in the period 1980–85.
Growth rates are corrected for initial income effect  
Regression (2) in Table 1 presents the results of regressing growth on all the
variables included in the Zi vector, investments, schooling, openness, and polit-
ical stability, but excluding corruption. The results are consistent with Solow’s
growth model and with common findings of the empirical literature. The ad-
justed R2 is equal to 0.62 and all coefficients except for schooling are signifi-
cant. The coefficient of lnY1975 is negative; its value of –1.89 is consistent with
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Note: Growth rates are corrected for initial income effects as follows: 
Gi –  α 1ln (Y 0 i)  + α 1 average (ln (Y 0) ) ,  α 1 based on regression (1).
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a convergence rate of almost 2 per cent per year, confirming the conditional
convergence hypothesis. The coefficient of investment is positive and equal to
0.14. An increase in investments of 7.5 per cent point, the standard deviation,
increases growth rates by 1.05 per cent, and increases the long-term income
level by 70 per cent. Schooling has also a positive coefficient, 0.131, but it is
not significant. The coefficient for openness is positive, 1.65. After investments,
the openness variable explains most of the growth differences; an increase of
the variable of one standard deviation implies an increase in growth of 0.76 per
cent per year, and an increase in long-term income of 49 per cent, confirming
the hypothesis that free trade spurs economic growth. Political instability has a
negative coefficient, –3.00, and has an explanatory variation of 0.36 per cent
growth per year, and an implied long-term income effect of 21 per cent.
The third regression (3) in Table 1 includes both corruption and the other in-
dependent variables. The adjusted R2 remains unchanged, relative to the previous
regression, while all coefficients, except for initial income, show a slight de-
crease in absolute value and in statistical significance. The increase in (the abso-
lute value of ) the coefficient of lnY1975 can be interpreted as an improvement of
the identification of the steady state path of the economy. Relative to the first re-
gression, the coefficient for corruption has dropped almost to zero, and has be-
come insignificant. A change of one standard deviation in the corruption variable
increases growth by a modest 0.20 per cent. The direct effect on the growth rate
of a reduction in the corruption index seems insubstantial, when compared to the
contribution of any of the other independent variables. But this result is mislead-
ing. The suggested relative insignificance of corruption is due to the fact that
large part of the effect of corruption on growth is transmitted through the other
variables, investments, schooling, openness, and political stability, and their co-
efficients partly reflect the indirect effects of corruption on growth. In the next
Section, we isolate the indirect effects for each transmission channel.
III. TRANSMISSION CHANNELS FOR CORRUPTION
Regression (3) only accounted for the direct effects of corruption on growth6.
We suggest, in line with the literature, that corruption is a pervasive phenome-
non that negatively affects the working of the economy in several ways. In this
section we explore the transmission channels through which corruption can af-
fect growth as captured by the other variables: investment, schooling, open-
6. It must be noted that the ‘direct’ effect of corruption on growth can be interpreted as that part
of the total effect whose transmission channels have not yet been identified.
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ness, and political instability. We estimate the dependence of the variables in Zi
on corruption, according to the following equation:
Zi = β0 + β1 ln(Y0 i) + β2Ci + µi (2)
where β0, β1 and β2, are four-dimensional vectors of coefficients; β1 describes
the effect of income at the beginning of the period, the latter describes the effect
of corruption on the vector of dependent variables Zi, and µi is the vector of re-
siduals.
Before presenting the results, we notice that we have to pay due attention to
the problem of causality among the various variables. It is not obvious from the
outset that causality runs from corruption to the transmission variables. The
problem of causality is pressing, since one can easily imagine variables such as
openness and political stability to affect corruption, as well as the other way
around. We controlled for endogeneity of the corruption variable by use of legal
origins as an instrument variable for corruption. As in Mo (2001), we also used
continental dummies and ethnolinguistic fractionalization as instrumental var-
iables, but the Hausman test rejected these as valid instruments for corruption
in most of our regressions7. Furthermore, we checked the robustness of our re-
sults including in the regression analyses various other independent variables
such as a democracy index and regional dummies. In Appendix 2, we present a
detailed report on our calculations with instrumental variables and other inde-
pendent variables.
Table 2
Indirect Transmission Channels as in equation (2)
7. Mo does not report tests for the validity of these instruments.
(4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent Variable: Investment Schooling Openness Political instability
Constant –0.32 –10.68 –0.14 –0.06
lnY1975
(0.96)
2.72*
(1.42)
1.94***
(0.36)
0.12
(0.09)
0.003
(0.26)
Corruption
(2.76)
–0.89*
(0.49)
–0.18
(0.13)
–0.07**
(0.03)
0.02**
(0.01)
N 48 48 48 48
Adjusted R2 0.38 0.69 0.36 0.21
Notes: Standard errors for coefficients in parentheses, standard deviation in parenthesis under the 
independent variable. Superscripts *** correspond to a 1% level of significance.
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1. The Investment Transmission Channel
As a first transmission channel we consider investments, which are affected by
corruption because it adds uncertainty to the returns on investment activities,
in two ways. First, bribes bring costs with them, when detected, and second,
agreements based on bribes are unenforceable (Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny
1995, 1996). Another effect on investment appears when one considers bribes
as an additional tax on investment (Southgate, Salazar-Canelos, Camacho-Saa
and Stewart 2000). The fourth regression, presented in Table 2, shows that, in-
deed, corruption has a substantial negative effect on the investment level. A one
standard deviation decrease in corruption levels increases investments by 2.46
per cent point, which in turn increases economic growth by 0.34 per cent per
year8. The effect of the investment transmission channel exceeds substantially
the direct corruption effect of 0.20 per cent growth per year (calculated above).
We tested the direction of causality between corruption and investments and
used a 2-stage least square (2SLS) estimation with legal origins as instrumental
variable for corruption, reported in Table 8, regression (16), Appendix 2. Using
2SLS, we find a substantial increase in the coefficient that measures the effect
of corruption on investments. At the same time, however, for this transmission
channel, the instrumental variable is rejected in the Hausman test, which can be
interpreted as evidence that legal origins have an extra effect on investments
that does not go through corruption. The problem we are confronted with is that
legal origins is a weak instrument for corruption. But the alternative instru-
ment, common in the literature, is ethnolinguistic fractionalization, which does
not pass the Hausman test neither on this transmission channel nor on others.
We thus cannot use the 2SLS coefficients for our quantitative assessment of the
transmission channels, but the evidence is sufficient to support the hypothesis
that causality runs from corruption to investments. We furthermore tested the
robustness of the coefficient in regression (4) by adding various other inde-
pendent variables to the regression, such as a democracy index, an OECD
dummy, and regional dummies. As shown in Table 12, regression (24), Appen-
dix 2, again the coefficient for corruption slightly increases. Together, the 2SLS
and the robustness tests provide sufficient substance to suggest that the coeffi-
cient for the effect of corruption on investments as reported in regression (4)
will not be overestimated.
8. From Table 1 regression (3), we multiply the investment coefficient (0.14) with 2.46.
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2. The Schooling Transmission Channel
Second, the literature emphasises the effects of corruption on education. Tanzi
and Davoodi’s (1997) empirical analysis suggests that corruption lowers the abil-
ity of the government to raise revenues, while it increases the amount of public
investment in large infrastructure projects. Thus, corruption decreases the avail-
ability of public funds for education. Mauro (1998) confirms this relationship by
direct estimation, as he finds that government expenditure on education is nega-
tively and significantly associated with corruption. From the coefficients of re-
gression (5), we find that a one standard deviation decrease in corruption is asso-
ciated with an increase of half a year of schooling of the people above 25 years.
This in turn results in an increase of growth of 0.06 per cent per year. The school-
ing transmission channel, being highly influenced by the income variable, proves
to be the one with the smallest effect in our estimations.
Similar to the analysis for investments, we tested the direction of causality
by use of an instrument. For this transmission channel, and for the two other
transmission variables as well, the 2SLS regressions passed the Hausman test.
We also tested the size of the coefficient by inclusion of other independent var-
iables. Quantitatively, the implications of the 2SLS and robustness tests are
comparable with those for investments. As reported in Table 8, regression (17),
the use of the instrument substantially increases the size of the coefficient. Add-
ing various other independent variables leaves the coefficient almost un-
changed, as shown in Table 12, regression (25). That is, the auxiliary analyses
suggest that causality runs from corruption to schooling, and that the coeffi-
cient for the effect of corruption on schooling as reported in regression (4) will
not be overestimated.
3. The Trade Openness Transmission Channel
The third transmissions channel deals with the effects on trade policies of cor-
rupted practices in governments. The literature in support of the general argu-
ment that corruption distorts policy making has been summarised in the intro-
duction. The influential paper by Krueger (1974) shows the mechanisms
through which import restriction become a substantial government-induced
source of rents, leading to rent seeking activities. Also, Southgate, Salazar-
Canelos, Camacho-Saa and Stewart (2000) describe the relation between cor-
ruption and the allocation of trade licenses, import quotas and the implementa-
tion of other trade limitations. The openness variable we employ in our analysis
is defined as the share of years the country has been open, according to Sachs
Kyklos_2004-03_S-303-472  Seite 439  Donnerstag, 22. Juli 2004  1:07 13
LORENZO PELLEGRINI/REYER GERLAGH
440
G4_HS:Aufträge:HEL002:15491_SB_Kyklos_2004-03:15491-A02:Kyklos_2004-03_S-303-472 28.5.04 22. Juli 2004 13:07
and Warner’s (1995) definition, in the period 1970–89. Indeed, to define coun-
tries as open or closed economies, Sachs and Warner used criteria that more or
less measure the possibility to capture trade rents and include: the size of black
market exchange premiums, import quotas, and tariffs9. Our estimation for the
openness transmission channel thus, more or less, describes the tendency in
corrupted societies to raise trade barriers by regulation, thus creating a poten-
tial source of influence and income for policy makers, and by custom bureauc-
racy, a potential source of bribe income for custom officials.
Regression (6), shows that, indeed, a one-standard deviation decrease in cor-
ruption is associated with an increase in the openness of a country of 0.19, in
turn associated with an increase in growth of 0.30 per cent per year. This trans-
mission channel has a smaller effect when compared to the investment trans-
mission channel, but it still exceeds the direct effect of corruption as measured
in regression (3). Following the same procedure as for the above transmission
channels, we carried out a 2SLS regression and found that this leaves the coef-
ficient almost unchanged (Table 8, regression (18)), while the use of other in-
dependent variables slightly decreases the coefficient (Table 12, regression
(26)). Thus, we conclude that causality runs from corruption to openness, and
that the coefficient reported in Table 2 is a reasonable estimate.
4. The Political Instability Transmission Channel
The last transmission channel we analyse runs through political instability. It is
argued that corruption ‘challenges the popular legitimacy of democratic insti-
tutions, and it feeds political instability and the violence that can flow from it’
(Mulloy 1999). Bardhan (1997) mentions the fact that in opinion pools made
in developing countries, corruption is usually the most important problem re-
ferred to by respondents. Political discontent is fuelled by the perception that
corrupted practises are widespread among governments and civil servants, and
this discontent creates room for political instability. Mo (2001) argues that cor-
ruption bolsters political instability, through its effects on income polarisation.
Regression (7) shows that corruption has a positive and significant effect on po-
litical instability. A one-standard deviation decrease in corruption is associated
with a decrease in the political instability index of 0.06, which in turn increases
growth by 0.14 per cent per year. Causality from corruption to political insta-
bility is confirmed by the use of the instrumental variable for corruption, re-
9. For a full description of the variables and of the method used see Sachs and Warner 1995,
pp. 64–67.
Kyklos_2004-03_S-303-472  Seite 440  Donnerstag, 22. Juli 2004  1:07 13
CORRUPTION’S EFFECT ON GROWTH AND ITS TRANSMISSION CHANNELS
441
G4_HS:Aufträge:HEL002:15491_SB_Kyklos_2004-03:15491-A02:Kyklos_2004-03_S-303-472 28.5.04 22. Juli 2004 13:07
ported in Table 8, regression (19). The size of the coefficient is robust both
against the use of an instrument and against the use of other independent vari-
ables, reported in Table 12, regression (27).
5. Direct and Indirect Effects of Corruption
Now that we have estimated the effect of corruption on the four variables in Z
in equation (1), we can single out the direct and indirect effects of corruption
on economic growth, and the effect of the independent variables in Z that are
not explained by corruption. Formally, after substitution of equation (2) into
(1), we obtain:
Gi = (α0 + α3β0) + (α1 + α3β1) ln(Y0i) + (α2 + α3β2) Ci + α3µi + εi (3)
where α2 is the direct effect of corruption on growth and α3β2 captures the
summed indirect effects of corruption on economic growth, and µi are the re-
siduals of equation (2). The coefficient estimates of this regression are reported
in Table 3.
Comparing the results of regression (8) with (3), there are two aspects that
stand out. First, the coefficient for corruption has become highly significant, and
secondly, it has increased by more than a factor 5. When taking into account the
transmission channels, corruption is the single most important variable explain-
ing growth. A one standard deviation decrease in corruption leads to an increase
in growth of 1 per cent per year, for a given initial income level. The long-term
income level increases by 140 per cent. These results are consistent with regres-
sion (1), as reported in Table 1, and certainly provide evidence of an outstanding
effect of corruption on growth. For any other independent variable, apart from
initial income, a one-standard deviation change has less effect. We notice that we
have omitted other institutional variables to avoid multi-collinearity, and since
corruption is positively correlated with those variables, the corruption coeffi-
cient also captures the effect of other institutional implicit variables.
Comparing our results with earlier estimates on corruption and growth, we
mention Mauro (1995) who finds that a one-standard-deviation decrease of the
corruption index increases the annual growth rate of GDP per capita by 0.8%
percentage point10, but after controlling for investment the coefficient of cor-
ruption is halved and becomes statistically insignificant. Mauro (1995) does
10. The analysis takes into consideration the time frame 1960–85 and GDP per capita growth rate
is regressed on corruption, GDP in 1960, secondary education in 1960 and population growth.
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not study explicitly the transmission channels. Our results are qualitatively sim-
ilar to Mo’s (2001) results, who also found the transmission channels to account
for more than 80% of the total effect of corruption on growth. But our results
are different in various aspects. Mo studied another set of transmission chan-
nels and specifically did not include the trade policy transmission channel.
Also, Mo studied a shorter time span, based on data from earlier sources, and
he seems to have used initial income, instead of the commonly used logarithm
of initial income, as independent variable to account for conditional conver-
gence. For these reasons, and because of the above-mentioned causality tests,
we consider our quantitative results more reliable.
Table 3
Growth regressions as in equation (3)
We summarise the contributions of the transmission channels in Table 4. The
direct effect or corruption on growth is captured through the coefficient α2, so
that the contribution of the direct effect relative to the total effect is α2 / (α2 +
α3β2). The transmission channels are captured through the vector multiplica-
tion α3β2. The relative contribution of the direct impact of corruption is 19%,
the relative contribution of the investment channel to the total effect is 32%, the
relative contribution of the schooling channel to the total effect is 5%, the rel-
Independent variable: G75–96 (8)
Constant 14.22
lnY1975
(0.960)
–1.19***
(0.08)
1 (Investment)
(5.783)
0.14***
(0.03)
µ2 (Schooling)
(1.483)
0.11
(0.10)
µ3 (Openness)
(0.361)
1.54***
(0.46)
µ4 (Political instability)
(0.105)
–2.58*
(1.51)
Corruption
(2.761)
–0.38***
(0.08)
N 48
Adjusted R2 0.62
Notes: Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5, 1% of significance respectively. Standard de-
viations are in parenthesis under the independent variables, standard errors are in parenthesis under 
the coefficients.
Kyklos_2004-03_S-303-472  Seite 442  Donnerstag, 22. Juli 2004  1:07 13
CORRUPTION’S EFFECT ON GROWTH AND ITS TRANSMISSION CHANNELS
443
G4_HS:Aufträge:HEL002:15491_SB_Kyklos_2004-03:15491-A02:Kyklos_2004-03_S-303-472 28.5.04 22. Juli 2004 13:07
ative contribution of the openness channel to the total effect is 28%, and the
relative contribution of the political instability channel to the total effect is
16%. Thus, the main effect of corruption on economic growth is transmitted
through the investment decision. This result is consistent with the empirical lit-
erature that underlined the importance of corruption on investment (e.g. Mauro
1995). The effect of corruption on trade openness is second-most important.
We emphasize this finding as even though it has been noted in the theoretical
literature, it has been overlooked by previous empirical analyses. Jointly, the
transmission channels studied here account for 81 per cent of the total negative
effect of corruption on growth.
Table 4
Relative Importance of Transmission Channels, as in equation (3)
IV. THE LONG-TERM EFFECT OF CORRUPTION ON THE 
TRANSMISSION VARIABLES
In this section we estimate the long-term effects of corruption on the transmis-
sion variables, investment, schooling, openness, and political instability. These
long-term effects can help us to appreciate the pervasive effect of corruption on
growth. There are two approaches through which we can estimate these long-
term effects. First, we can use a technique similar to the one we used to calcu-
late the long-term effects of corruption on growth. That is, we use the results
from the previous section to calculate the direct effect of corruption on the
transmission variables as presented in Table 2 and add the indirect effect
through the income channel based on data presented in Table 1 and Table 2.
Second, we run regressions of the transmission channel variables assuming in-
stitutions to be the only determinants of the transmission variables (i.e. we ex-
clude initial income as an explanatory variable). Comparing the results from
both approaches provides a robustness check of our findings.
Transmission channels
α 3
(Table 1)
β2
(Table 2)
Contribution to
α2 + α3β2
Relative
Contribution
Corruption –0.073 19%
Investment 0.136 –0.894 –0.122 32%
Schooling 0.113 –0.183 –0.021 5%
Openness 1.541 –0.068 –0.105 28%
Political Instability –2.582 0.023 –0.059 16%
Total –0.38 100%
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The long-term effect of corruption on the transmission variables, as they
were estimated in the previous session, can be calculated as:
∆Z
∞
 / C = β2 + (– (α2 + α3β2) / (α1 + α3β1)) β1 (4)
The first term, on the right hand side, is the direct effect of corruption on the
transmission variables (from equation (2)). It measures the effect of corruption
on the transmission variables abstracting from income effects. The second
term, on the right hand side, multiplies the long-term income effect of corrup-
tion (based on coefficients as expressed in equation (3))11 multiplied by the ef-
fect of income on the transmission variables (from equation (2)). The second
term can be interpreted as the long-term effect of corruption on the transmis-
sion variables operating through the income variable. The results are summa-
rized in Table 5.
Table 5
Long-term effects of Corruption on Transmission Variables, as in equation (4)
A one standard deviation decrease in corruption levels increases the long-term
level of investment by 4.86 per cent points, consistent with Mauro’s (1995)
finding. It further increases schooling by 2.21 years (for the population more
than 25 years old), increases the openness coefficient by 0.30 and increases the
political instability index by 0.06. These results reveal the substantial long-term
effect of corruption on those variables that are drivers of economic growth.
As a check for these estimates, we also directly estimate the dependence of
the transmission channel variables on the corruption level. We recall from the
introduction that the recent literature, backed by various empirical studies, ar-
gues that institutions are persistent over time and it suggests that they are the
main determinants of the long-term economic performance. Therefore, we may
estimate the long-term effects of corruption on the transmission variables omit-
ting the initial income variable as an explanatory variable. The specification of
equation (2) becomes:
11. See Appendix 1 for a derivation of the long-term income effects.
Investment Schooling Openness Political instability
Direct effect –0.89 –0.18 –0.07 0.02
Indirect income effect –0.87 –0.62 –0.04 0.00
Long-term effect –1.76 –0.80 –0.11 0.02
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Z i = γ0 + γ1C i + ν i (5)
where the variable lnY1975 has been omitted as independent variable, γ0 and γ1
are four-dimensional vectors of coefficients; the latter describes the effect of
corruption on the vector of dependent variables Zi and ν i is the vector of resid-
uals. The coefficients are presented in Table 6.
Table 6
Indirect Transmission Channels calculated as in equation (5)
Comparing the results of Table 5 associated with equation (4) and Table 6 asso-
ciated with equation (5), we observe a close resemblance between the values
found for the long-term effect of corruption on the transmission variables. The
estimates of the coefficients in equation (4) are slightly larger, in absolute
value, than those from equation (5). This result can be explained by the fact that
equation (4) implicitly assumes the level of corruption to be constant over time,
and thus it gives too much weight to the future effect of present corruption lev-
els. At the same time, the small gap between the two sets of values strongly sup-
ports the robustness of our results and the relative persistence over time of cor-
ruption levels.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have studied the effect of corruption on economic growth, di-
rectly and through its impact on investment, schooling, trade openness, and po-
litical instability. The outcomes confirm a negative effect of corruption on
growth, a conclusion accepted by most of the literature. The indirect impact of
corruption is substantial, and our results justify the recent emphasis that interna-
tional organizations put on corruption in particular and institutional soundness
in general as important determinants of economic development (Meier 2001).
(9) (10) (11) (12)
Dependent Variable: Investment Schooling Openness Political instability
Constant 26.70 8.59 1.04 –0.02
Corruption
(2.76)
–1.63***
(0.32)
–0.71***
(0.10)
–0.10***
(0.02)
0.02***
(0.01)
N 48 48 48 48
Adjusted R2 0.34 0.50 0.35 0.23
Notes: Standard errors for coefficients in parentheses, standard deviation in parenthesis under the 
independent variable. Superscripts *** correspond to a 1% level of significance.
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Now that a consensus is emerging on the importance of institutional characteris-
tics, the obvious search is for strategies that can be used to attack corruption. This
will not prove simple, as the past has shown corruption to be persistent over time.
Based on the empirical results, we can search for a better understanding of
the transmission channels through which corruption affects the economic per-
formance. While combating corruption is a long-term task, an understanding
of the transmission channels through which corruption affects the economy
may suggest ways to limit corruption’s negative, but indirect, effects on growth.
Our results suggest that the most important (for its effect on growth) policy var-
iables that are likely to be distorted by the presence of corruption are invest-
ments and trade openness. As a further issue for investigation, we hope to study
the interaction effects. Such an analysis could help us to understand whether
corruption reduces investments, or reduces the positive effects of investments
on growth, e.g. because of an inferior allocation.
APPENDIX 1:
LONG-TERM INCOME EFFECTS
In this appendix, we derive the long-term income effects as in equation (11). To
be sure, let us recall that the conditional convergence hypothesis assumes that
all countries, when the independent variables remain constant, converge to a
steady state with the same positive economic growth rate but with different lev-
els of income. Each country converges to its own growth trajectory. The long-
term income effects we calculate thus measure the persistent difference in in-
come levels, without assuming that income levels themselves converge.
We assume that economic growth G for country i depends on its initial in-
come Y0, corruption C, and a vector of other explanatory variables Z, as de-
scribed in equation (1). Since Gi represents income growth over a period of T
years, we can re-write equation (1) as:
(ln (YTi) – ln (Y0 i)) / T = α0 + α1 ln (Y0 i) + α2Ci + α3Z i + ε0i (6)
and after rearranging terms, we derive income for country i at the end of the
period (year T).
ln (YTi) = α0T + (α1T + 1) ln (Y0 i) + α2CiT + α3ZiT + ε0iT (7)
We are interested in the expected difference in income between two scenarios
labelled i and j, each with its own characteristics (Ci; Zi) and (Cj; Zj), and thus
we eliminate the error terms:
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E (∆ln (YT)) = (α1T + 1) ∆ln (Y0) + α2T ∆C + α3T ∆Z (8)
where ∆ln (Yt) = ln (Ytj) – ln (Yti), ∆C = Cj  – Ci, and ∆Z = Z j – Z i. To assess the
long-term effects of C and Z on income, we assume ∆C and ∆Z constant over
time, and we study propagation of income differences over time. After two pe-
riods of T years, income differences are equal to:
E (∆ln (Y2T)) = (α1T + 1)2 ∆ln (Y0) + (α1T + 2)) (α2T∆C + α3T∆Z) (9)
After three periods, we have
E (∆ln (Y3T)) = (α1T + 1)3 ∆ln (Y0) + (1 + (α1T + 1) +
(α1T + 1)2) (α2T∆C + α3T∆Z) (10)
For regressions (1)–(3), we have 0 < α1T + 1 < 1 (e.g., regression (3) has α1 =
–0.0196, T = 21), so that for t → ∞, the first term at the right hand side vanishes
and the other terms reduce to
E (∆ln (Y)) = – (α2/α1) ∆C – (α3/α1) ∆Z (11)
The ratio –(α2 / α1) captures the long-term income effect of changes in the cor-
ruption index. Similarly, the ratio –(α3 / α1) captures the long-term impact of
changes in other explanatory variables. Taking exponentials we can rewrite the
equation and calculate the relative long-term income effect as:
(∆Y
∞
)/Y
∞
 = exp(– (α2/α1) ∆C – (α3/α1) ∆Z) – 1 (12)
For small values of (α2/α1) ∆C and (α3/α1)∆Z, we can use the approximation
∆Y
∞
 /Y
∞
 ≈ – (α2/α1) ∆C – (α3/α1) ∆Z (13)
APPENDIX 2:
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
In this appendix, we present the analysis that is essential for testing causality
and robustness of coefficients. A common way to test for the causality is the use
of instrumental variables in 2 Stage Least Squares (2SLS) regressions. A good
instrumental variable is highly correlated with the instrumented variable and
should not affect the dependent variable apart from its effect on the corruption
variable. For our analysis of transmission channels, we should find an instru-
ment variable that is highly correlated with corruption, but that is otherwise not
related to the transmission variables.
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In the literature, two variables have been used as instrument for corruption:
ethnolinguistic fractionalization (e.g. Mauro 1995) and legal origins (e.g. Fre-
driksson and Svensson 2003). On the basis of a validity test, we choose legal
origins as instrumental variable for corruption. The Hausman test for legal or-
igins does not reject the null hypothesis of the validity of the instrument in all
but one regressions at the 5% level of confidence. The validity of the instru-
ment is rejected at the 10% level of confidence when we estimate the effect of
corruption on investment. As noticed in the main text, the Hausman test rejec-
tion suggests a careful interpretation of the 2SLS results for investment. The re-
jection of the null hypothesis in the Hausman test can be interpreted as an evi-
dence that legal origins have some effect on investment that does not go
through corruption. Therefore the coefficient on the instrumental variable will
be overestimated. Indeed we find the investment transmission channel to have
a much larger effect than in the original regressions.
The results of the 2SLS are presented in Table 7, Table 8, Table 9, and
Table 10. The results remain qualitatively the same as for our basis analysis.
That is, our basis results are supported qualitatively with the use of the instru-
mental variable. At the same time, caution note is needed as the R2 of the re-
gression of legal origins on corruption is 13%; the instrumental variable’s re-
sults should be interpreted with care. We highlight the two main results. First,
in the final growth regression (20), Table 9, that includes the indirect transmis-
sion channels, instrumented corruption has a coefficient of –0.33 compared to
–0.38 for the basis estimation in the main text. Second, as shown in Table 10,
investment remains the most important transmission channel and openness the
second one.
After controlling for causality using the instrument, we provide checks for
robustness adding a variable for political freedom and a set of regional dum-
mies. The variable we use for democracy is an average for the years 1980–1985
of the democracy score from the Polity IV dataset (see Plümper and Martin
(2003) for a description of the variable and for a recent survey of the literature
on democracy and growth). Regional dummies have been found to be signifi-
cant in many recent empirical analyses and adding them to our analysis controls
that our results are not driven by geographical factors or by any particular
group of countries (e.g. Rodriguez and Rodrik 2001).
In Table 11, Table 12 and Table 13 we present our results including the con-
trol variables. The overall effect of corruption holds surprisingly well: the co-
efficient becomes –0.37 (was –0.38). As for the transmission channels, and
their relative importance, we find that the direct effect of corruption is in-
creased and we still find that investment and openness are the most important
transmission channels.
Kyklos_2004-03_S-303-472  Seite 448  Donnerstag, 22. Juli 2004  1:07 13
CORRUPTION’S EFFECT ON GROWTH AND ITS TRANSMISSION CHANNELS
449
G4_HS:Aufträge:HEL002:15491_SB_Kyklos_2004-03:15491-A02:Kyklos_2004-03_S-303-472 28.5.04 22. Juli 2004 13:07
Table 7
Growth regressions as in equation (1)
Table 8
Indirect Transmission Channels as in equation (2)
Independent variable: G75–96 (13) (14) (15)
Constant 6.39 12.98 12.95
lnY1975
(0.88)
–0.35
(0.27)
–1.70***
(0.37)
–1.80***
(0.40)
Investment
(6.20)
0.11***
(0.04)
0.12***
(0.04)
Schooling
(2.63)
0.15
(0.11)
0.19
(0.12)
Openness
(0.44)
1.622***
(0.498)
1.65***
(0.50)
Political instability
(0.13)
–2.33
(1.38)
–2.62*
(1.44)
Corruption
(1.14)
–0.33
(0.21)
0.13
(0.17)
N 37 37 37
Adjusted R2 0.04 0.53 0.53
Notes: 2SLS estimation with average annual GDP per capita growth rate as dependent variable. Su-
perscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5, 1% of significance respectively. Standard deviations are 
in parenthesis under the independent variables, standard errors are in parenthesis under the coeffi-
cients. The variable Corruption is the predicted value of corruption (instrumented by the legal ori-
gins variable).
(16) (17) (18) (19)
Dependent Variable: Investment Schooling Openness Political instability
Constant 4.78 –13.23 –1.49 0.40
lnY1975
(0.88)
3.54***
(0.95)
2.35***
(0.27)
0.27***
(0.07)
–0.05**
(0.02)
Corruption 
(1.14)
–1.64**
(0.74)
–0.44**
(0.21)
–0.06
(0.06)
0.03*
(0.02)
N 37 37 37 37
Adjusted R2 0.39 0.72 0.33 0.19
Notes: Standard errors for coefficients in parentheses, standard deviation in parenthesis under the 
independent variable. Superscripts *** correspond to a 1% level of significance.
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Overall our main results are supported by the use of the instrumental variable
and by the use of control variables. The evidence presented in this section sup-
port the results we reported in the main text.
Table 9
Growth regressions as in equation (3)
Table 10
Relative Importance of Transmission Channels, as in equation (3)
Independent variable: G75–96 (20)
Constant 6.39
lnY1975
(0.88)
–0.35*
(0.19)
µ1 (Investment)
(4.68)
0.12***
(0.04)
µ2 (Schooling)
(1.34)
0.19
(0.12)
µ3 (Openness)
(0.35)
1.65***
(0.50)
µ4 (Political instability)
(0.11)
–2.62*
(1.44)
Corruption
(1.14)
–0.33**
(0.15)
N 37
Adjusted R2 0.53
Notes: Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5, 1% of significance, respectively. Standard de-
viations are in parenthesis under the independent variables, standard errors are in parenthesis under 
the coefficients.
Transmission channels α 3
(Table 7)
β 2
(Table 8)
Contribution to
α 2 + α 3β 2
Relative
Contribution
Corruption 0.134 –41%
Investment –1.639 0.121 –0.198 60%
Schooling –0.442 0.187 –0.083 25%
Openness –0.063 1.651 –0.105 32%
Political Instability 0.030 –2.616 –0.079 24%
Total –0.330 100%
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Table 11
Growth regressions as in equation (1)
Independent variable: G75–96 (21) (22) (23)
Constant 18.75 16.37 18.75
lnY1975
(0.96)
–1.64***
(0.39)
–1.75***
(0.37)
–1.64***
(0.31)
Investment
(7.51)
0.09***
(0.03)
Schooling
(2.72)
0.01
(0.10)
Openness
(0.46)
1.24**
(0.53)
Political instability
(0.12)
–2.17
(1.40)
Democracy
(3.59)
0.00
(0.08)
–0.03
(0.06)
0.00
(0.06)
Dummy for Latin America –1.52**
(0.58)
–0.81
(0.50)
–1.52***
(0.45)
Dummy for Africa –3.64***
(0.72)
–2.13***
(0.67)
–3.64***
(0.56)
Dummy for South Asia –0.63
(0.79)
–0.16
(0.64)
–0.63
(0.61)
Dummy for OECD –0.18
(0.72)
–0.27
(0.68)
–0.18
(0.56)
µ1 (Investment)
(4.68)
0.09***
(0.03)
µ2 (Schooling)
(1.34)
0.01
(0.10)
µ3 (Openness)
(0.35)
1.24**
(0.53)
µ4 (Political instability)
(0.11)
–2.17
(1.40)
Corruption
(2.76)
–0.37***
(0.11)
–0.18*
(0.10)
–0.37***
(0.08)
N 47 47 47
Adjusted R2 0.49 0.69 0.69
Notes: OLS estimation with average annual GDP per capita growth rate as dependent variable. Su-
perscripts *. **. *** correspond to a 10. 5. 1% of significance respectively. Standard deviations are 
in parenthesis under the independent variables. standard errors are in parenthesis under the coeffi-
cients.
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Table 12
Indirect Transmission Channels as in equation (2)
Table 13
Relative Importance of Transmission Channels. as in equation (3)
(24) (25) (26) (27)
Dependent Variable: Investment Schooling Openness Political instability
Constant 9.10 –9.66 1.89 0.32
lnY1975
(0.96)
2.14
(1.87)
1.87***
(0.54)
–0–0.16
(0.11)
–0.04
(0.04)
Democracy
(3.59)
0.17
(0.38)
–0.05
(0.11)
0.01
(0.02)
0.00
(0.01)
Dummy for Latin America –5.78**
(2.77)
–0.85
(0.79)
–0.05
(0.16)
0.06
(0.06)
Dummy for Africa –11.37***
(3.45)
–1.03
(0.99)
–0.45**
(0.20)
–0.04
(0.07)
Dummy for South Asia –3.73
(3.76)
–0.07
(1.08)
–0.28
(0.22)
–0.10
(0.08)
Dummy for OECD –5.70
(3.46)
0.33
(0.99)
0.57***
(0.20)
0.05
(0.07)
Corruption
(2.76)
–1.08**
(0.51)
–0.16
(0.15)
–0.04
(0.03)
0.02*
(0.01)
N 47 47 47 47
Adjusted R2 0.48 0.68 0.53 0.19
Notes: Standard errors for coefficients in parentheses. standard deviation in parenthesis under the 
independent variable. Superscripts *** correspond to a 1% level of significance.
Transmission channels
α 3
(Table 12)
β 2
(Table 11)
Contribution to
α 2 + α 3β 2
Relative
Contribution
Corruption –0.178 48%
Investment 0.090 –0.098 –0.098 26%
Schooling 0.010 –0.002 –0.002 0%
Openness 1.241 –0.050 –0.050 14%
Political Instability –2.171 –0.043 –0.043 12%
Total –0.371 100%
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APPENDIX 3:
REGRESSIONS’ VARIABLES SOURCES AND DESCRIPTION
The data on corruption are taken from the Transparency International database.
Transparency International is an international organization whose objective is
to struggle against corruption and among other activities spreads information
about it. The Corruption Perception Index is a composite index available from
the period 1980–85 and is based on interviews of ‘credible’ sources (Lambs-
dorff 2001). The scores of the index range between 0 and 10. where a low (high)
score indicates high (low) levels of corruption. Corruption in the survey refers
both to the magnitude of bribes and to the frequency of bribe asking. In the
present paper the values of the original index has been subtracted from 10. so
that an increase in the index will have the intuitive meaning of an increase in
corruption12.
The data collected and elaborated in the paper are from the following data-
base:
• Penn World Table 6.0 (preliminary version) by Alan Heston & Robert Sum-
mers (http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/; http://webhost.bridgew.edu/baten). In-
come measures and rates. Data on investment.
• Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth by Jeffrey D. Sachs
and Andrew M. Warner (http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html).
Data on trade openness and political instability.
• Barro-Lee Data Set for a Panel of 138 Countries Robert J. Barro and Lee
Jong-Wha. (http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html). Data on
schooling (as updated in April 2000) and political instability.
• Corruption Perception Index by Transparency International (http://www.
transparency.org/) and Center for Globalization and Europeanization of the
Economy. Georg-August-University of Goettingen (http://www.gwdg.de/
~uwvw/). Data on corruption.
• Polity IVd Dataset by Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jaggers, CIDCM, Uni-
versity of Maryland (http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/index.htm#po
lity4d). Data on democracy.
• The World Bank Dataset by the World Bank (http://www.worldbank.org/
research/growth/pdfiles/request2.xls). Data on Legal origins.
12. For a summary of advantages, and disadvantages, of perceptive corruption indexes cf. Mauro
1997, p. 83.
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Y1975/L1975 GDP per capita in the year 1975 (1996 international prices; Chain
index; Penn World Table 6.0).
Y1996/L1996 same variable for 1996.
investment is the average of the share of Real Gross Domestic Investment (pri-
vate and public) on Real GDP per capita (Penn World Table 6.0) in the pe-
riod 1975–1996.
openness is the proportion of years in which the country has been open (accord-
ing to Sachs and Warner’s (1995) definition) in the period 1965–1990 (Nat-
ural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth).
corruption is an average of the value of the corruption perception index for the
period 1980–1985 (Corruption Perception Index).
political instability is an average of the number of assassinations per million of
inhabitants and revolutions in the period 1970–1985.
schooling is the average number of schooling years in the population over the
age of 25 in 1975.
democracy is the sum of the score in autocracy and democracy. The original in-
dex ranges from –10 to 10, we reorganized it on a 0 to 10 scale.
legal origins is a set of dummy variables that characterize the country as Scan-
dinavian, French, English or German.
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SUMMARY
A common finding of recent theoretical and empirical literature is that corruption has a negative ef-
fect on economic growth. In the paper, through growth regression analysis, we estimate the direct
and indirect effects of corruption on economic growth. The indirect transmission channels, specifi-
cally investments, trade policy, schooling, and political stability, analysed in our study prove to be
significant in explaining the deleterious effect of corruption on growth rates. We find that one stand-
ard deviation increase in the corruption index is associated with a decrease in investments of 2.46
per centage points, which in turn decreases economic growth by 0.34 per cent per year. The second,
by importance, transmission channel is openness: a standard deviation increase in the corruption in-
dex is associated with a decrease of the openness index by 0.19, resulting in a decrease in economic
growth by 0.30 percent per year. Jointly, the transmission channels explain 81 per cent of the effect
of corruption on growth. While combating corruption is a long-term task, an understanding of the
transmission channels, through which corruption affects the economy, may suggest ways to limit cor-
ruption’s negative, but indirect, effects on growth.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Ein häufig zu findendes Resultat in der theoretischen und empirischen Literatur ist, dass Korruption
eine negative Auswirkung auf das Wirtschaftswachstum hat. In diesem Essay schätzen wir anhand
einer Regressionsanalyse die direkten und indirekten Einflüsse, welche die Korruption auf das
Wachstum ausübt. Es stellt sich heraus, dass die indirekten Faktoren, die wir in unserer Studie ana-
lysieren, nämlich Investitionen, Handelspolitik, Ausbildung und politische Stabilität, auf signifikante
Weise den mindernden Effekt erklären, den Korruption auf Wachstumsraten ausübt. Eine Erhöhung
des Korruptionsindexes um eine Standardabweichung bewirkt eine Verringerung von Investitionen
um 2.46 Prozentpunkte, was wiederum das Wirtschaftswachstum um 0.34% pro Jahr vermindert.
Der zweitwichtigste Faktor ist der Grad der Offenheit einer Volkswirtschaft: Eine Erhöhung des Kor-
ruptionsindexes um eine Standardabweichung ist assoziiert mit einem Rückgang des Offenheitsinde-
xes um 0.19 Prozentpunkte, was in einer Verringerung des Wirtschaftswachstums um 0.30% pro Jahr
resultiert. Alle Faktoren zusammen erklären 81 Prozent des Effektes von Korruption auf das Wachs-
tum einer Volkswirtschaft. Korruptionsbekämpfung ist eine langfristige Aufgabe. Ein gutes Verständ-
nis der Transmissionskanäle, durch welche die Korruption die Wirtschaft beeinflusst, könnte dabei
helfen, die negativen, wenngleich indirekten, Auswirkungen der Korruption auf das Wachstum ein-
zuschränken.
RÉSUMÉ
Un résultat partagé à la fois par la littérature théorique et empirique est que la corruption a un effet
négatif sur la croissance économique. Dans cet article, nous estimons les effets directs et indirects
de la corruption sur la croissance économique en appliquant une analyse par régression. Les canaux
de transmissions indirects, notamment les investissements, la politique commerciale, l’éducation et
la stabilité politique, analysés dans notre étude, s’avèrent être significatifs dans l’explication des ef-
fets nuisibles de la corruption sur le taux de croissance de l’économie. Nos estimations montrent
qu’une augmentation de l’écart type de l’indice de corruption est associée à une diminution des in-
vestissements de 2.46%, ce qui à son tour entraîne une diminution de la croissance économique de
0.34% par an. Le second canal de transmission, par ordre d’importance, est le degré d’ouverture de
l’économie: une augmentation de l’écart type de l’indice de corruption est associée à une diminution
de 0.19% de l’indice d’ouverture, résultant en une diminution de la croissance économique de 0.30%
par an. Pris dans leur ensemble, les canaux de transmission expliquent 81% des effets de la corrup-
tion sur la croissance. La lutte contre la corruption étant un combat qui se conçoit sur le long terme,
comprendre les canaux de transmission à travers lesquels la corruption affecte l’économie peut per-
mettre de limiter ses effets négatifs, bien qu’indirects, sur la croissance.
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